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the operation of the financial system. I ask this
basic question: What sorts of financial instability
are the direct responsibility of the Federal Reserve
System and what sorts are the responsibility of
others or simply a consequence of the behavior
of highly competitive markets? In particular, it is
a mistake to assume that every financial problem
is evidence of a policy failure, or requires a policy
response.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their assis-
tance and comments, especially Alton Gilbert,
David Wheelock, Mark Vaughan, and Bill
Emmons. I retain full responsibility for errors.
FEDERAL RESERVE
RESPONSIBILITIES
The Federal Reserve has three main respon-
sibilities. One is to contribute to maximum sus-
tainable economic growth by maintaining low
and stable inflation, or price stability for short.
The second is regulation and supervision of banks
and their holding companies to contribute to sta-
bility of the banking system. The third is provision
of payments services including distribution of
currency, clearing of paper checks, and electronic
payments services. Success in these three areas
contributes to, but does not guarantee, stability
of output and employment. Success certainly
does not guarantee stability of prices in financial
markets, as we have seen from the performance
of the stock market in recent years. Despite this
I
’m delighted to be here to speak at the
University of Central Arkansas. I’m gradu-
ally making way around the state to the
various campuses; perhaps over the next
few years I’ll manage to speak at all the other
Arkansas campuses I’ve not yet visited. I hope so.
I have a long-standing interest in understand-
ing how and why financial markets sometimes
become dysfunctional. When I first started study-
ing economics, in the late 1950s, the subject
seemed to be a special topic in economic history.
And that remained my view through graduate
school. About the time I began my first university
appointment, in 1963, financial markets began to
become less stable. The issues in the early 1960s,
for the most part, centered on the gold standard
and instabilities in the Bretton Woods system of
fixed exchange rates. But before too many more
years had passed, bouts of instability began to
appear in the domestic financial markets.
Occasional episodes of financial instability
seem now to be the norm, and indeed in recent
years operation of our nation’s financial system
has been subject to substantial shocks. A partial
list would include the sudden stock market crash
of 1987 and the slow-motion crash starting in
early 2000. The list would also include the finan-
cial market disruption in the fall of 1998, after
Russia defaulted on its bond obligations and Long-
Term Capital Management experienced severe
pressures that brought the firm to the brink of
disorderly collapse. And who can forget the severe
stress in the payments system in the hours and
days following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New
York and Washington?
My purpose this evening is to address the role
of the Federal Reserve in maintaining stability infact, it is also true that Fed failure to achieve its




The best way I can communicate what it
means to preserve financial stability is to describe
events during several periods in our nation’s his-
tory when the nation was not able to maintain
financial stability. If some of these examples seem
old and out of date, that is because we must use
such examples to explore the importance of price
stability given that the nation has enjoyed low and
stable inflation for most of the last 20 years.
I begin with the fall of 1907, the last episode
of a major breakdown in our nation’s banking
system prior to the formation of the Federal
Reserve. Banking problems in the fall of 1907
were a catalyst for stimulating change in the role
of our government in the operation of the national
financial system. The United States did not have
a central bank at that time—the Federal Reserve
began operations in 1914—and did not have fed-
eral deposit insurance, which was established in
the 1930s. With no federal deposit insurance,
the willingness of people to hold bank deposits
depended on their confidence in the strength of
the banks.
New York City was the nation’s financial
center, as it remains to this day. The most impor-
tant stock exchange in the nation was located in
New York City, and the uninterrupted operation
of the stock exchange depended on short-term
loans to stock brokers by banks located in New
York City. Businesses located throughout the
nation settled transactions among themselves
with drafts drawn upon banks located in New
York City. Disruptions to the operation of the
banks in New York City created disruptions in
the nation’s payments system.
Prior to 1907, there had been a series of
episodes in which adverse developments under-
mined the confidence of the public in the financial
strength of banks. At these times, large numbers
of depositors ran on their banks to withdraw cur-
rency. Over time banks developed well defined
mechanisms for dealing with such bank runs
while avoiding disruption in the payments system.
These mechanisms, which were coordinated by
the clearing houses through which banks cleared
checks, included lending currency to some of
the banks under greatest pressure from depositor
runs and issuing temporary certificates that mem-
bers of the clearing houses could use for settlement
among themselves.
During some of these periods of bank runs,
banks were able to meet the demands of their
depositors for currency, thus avoiding disruptions
in the payments system. During other periods,
however, these private remedies for bank runs
were not effective in preserving the operation of
the payments system. During 1873 and 1893,
members of the clearing house in New York City
responded to runs by temporarily refusing to pay
currency to their depositors on demand.
These periods of suspension of currency pay-
ments involved major disruptions in the payments
system of the nation because at the time much
commerce involved payment with currency. It is
important to realize, however, that disruption in
the financial system would have been worse in
1873 and 1893 if banks had not suspended cur-
rency payments to depositors. Runs on banks cre-
ated a kind of implosion of the banking system,
as banks attempted to quickly sell their assets to
obtain the currency demanded by their depositors.
Suspension of currency payments stopped the
implosion of the banking system. Even though
banks were able to resume currency payments
to depositors within about a month of the sus-
pensions in 1873 and 1893, these periods of sus-
pension of currency payments created major
disruptions in economic activity in the United
States.
Now consider the experience of 1907. Econ-
omic activity peaked in May 1907. In the fall,
events unique to 1907 led to a run on a major
trust company in New York City that was not a
member of the clearinghouse. Members of the
clearinghouse decided to withhold aid from the
trust company. That decision appears to have been
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triggered runs on members of the clearinghouse.
When the private remedies were not effective for
coping with the depositor runs, members of the
clearinghouse decided to suspend currency pay-
ments to their depositors.
As in 1873 and 1893, the suspension of cur-
rency payments in the fall of 1907 stopped further
reductions in bank assets, but at the cost of a major
disruption in the payments system that aggravated
the economic recession that had started in May
1907. This episode and many others demonstrate
clearly the connection between banking stability
and stability of output and employment.
The political backlash from the 1907 bank-
ing panic eventually led to the formation of the
Federal Reserve System in 1914. The founders of
the Federal Reserve believed that an important
function of the new central bank was to provide
currency to banks to meet temporary increases
in currency demand by bank customers. The Fed
provided assistance by making loans to member
banks through the Fed’s discount window.
The United States experienced several minor
recessions in the 1920s, but no generalized finan-
cial problems. It appeared that the Federal Reserve
was working as intended. But then, in October
1929, the stock market crashed. The crash was a
major shock to the U.S. financial system, but it did
not itself necessarily lead to the Great Depression.
One view of the onset of the Great Depression
assigns much of the blame to the Federal Reserve
System, which failed in its mandate to maintain
price stability and a sound banking system. The
Federal Reserve permitted the money supply to
fall sharply during the early 1930s, leading to
sharply falling prices of goods, services, and
wages. The consumer price index declined about
25 percent between 1929 and 1933. This experi-
ence with deflation, as well the Japanese experi-
ence in the 1990s, demonstrates conclusively
that a major deflation is extremely damaging to
banking stability and economic activity.
Businesses and households that had borrowed
funds in the 1920s prior to the onset of deflation
in 1930 did not have sufficient cash flow to meet
their debt obligations. As prices and wages fell,
debt increased in real terms. For example, a house-
hold that had taken out a mortgage in the 1920s
might be unable to make the mortgage payments
as wages fell, even assuming that the homeowner
remained employed. Of course, many became
unemployed. Eventually many businesses and
households defaulted on their debt obligations,
undermining the solvency of their creditors and
the confidence of depositors in the financial
strength of their banks.
The U.S. banking system experienced a series
of depositor runs during the early 1930s. The
Federal Reserve failed to offset the reserves that
banks lost through currency withdrawals by their
depositors. Banks no longer employed their pre-
Fed private remedies for runs, because they
expected the Federal Reserve to deal with runs.
This was a period of policy drift; neither the
Federal Reserve nor the banks themselves acted
to halt the implosion of the banking system.
Pressure on the banks became so great that in
March 1933, shortly after his inauguration,
President Roosevelt declared a banking holiday
for the entire nation. Every bank in the nation
was closed for at least a few days. Government
authorities permitted banks to resume operations
as they certified the banks to be in sound financial
condition. Customers of thousands of banks that
did not resume operation had their bank deposits
frozen until the failed banks were liquidated.
The disruption in the operation of the pay-
ments system in March 1933 was greater than
during the earlier periods of suspension of cur-
rency payments. During the periods of suspension
of currency payments, banks had remained in
operation and processed payments initiated by
their depositors in the form of checks. In short,
in 1933, the Federal Reserve presided over the
largest banking crisis in the history of the United
States. The nation’s response was to establish a
system of federal deposit insurance, to make
banking panics less likely in the future.
The 1930s illustrate the damage that deflation
can create in an economy; the 1970s, the period
of the Great Inflation, illustrates the damage of
high inflation. The inflation began to take root in
1965, slowly at first. Then, the entire decade of
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inflation. The lowest year-over-year percentage
change in the consumer price index was 3.3 per-
cent in 1972, and even that performance was an
artificial result of wage-price controls that could
not be sustained in the long run. The inflation rate
rose every year from 1976, when the inflation
rate was 5.8 percent, to 1980, when the inflation
rate was 13.5 percent.
Rising inflation during the 1970s had adverse
effects on the financial system for several reasons.
Whereas deflation in the early 1930s damaged
borrowers by increasing the real value of debt,
inflation in the 1970s damaged lenders by decreas-
ing the real value of debt. Loans negotiated while
inflation was relatively low in the 1950s and early
1960s were repaid in dollars with lower pur-
chasing power, thus undermining the financial
strength of lenders.
After a persistent rise in the inflation rate for
several years, businesses and households began
to borrow on the basis of expectations that high
inflation rates would continue indefinitely. Inter-
est rates that borrowers would have considered
extremely high a few years earlier appeared more
acceptable in light of their expectation of contin-
ued high inflation.
The rate of inflation declined sharply during
the early 1980s after an aggressive tightening of
monetary policy in late 1979. The consumer price
index, which rose 13.5 percent in 1980, increased
only 3.2 percent in 1982. This abrupt slowing of
inflation put financial pressure on the businesses
and households that had borrowed at relatively
high interest rates in anticipation of continuing
high inflation. Of course, some businesses and
households could refinance their debt as interest
rates declined during the 1980s, but not all could
because they were locked into long-term obliga-
tions. Perhaps reflecting expectations that inflation
would rise once again, long-term interest rates
declined much more slowly than did the rate of
inflation. The interest rate on 10-year Treasury
securities peaked at 15.3 percent in September
1981 and remained above 10 percent until
November 1985.
The episodes of the Great Depression and the
end of the Great Inflation show clearly the damage
from an unexpected decline in the rate of infla-
tion. In the first case, inflation went from about
zero to roughly –10 percent per year; in the sec-
ond case, inflation went from roughly 10 percent
to roughly 4 percent per year. Inflation itself
causes many difficulties; the lesson is to avoid
inflation in the first place, to avoid both the prob-
lems from inflation and from its ending.
The relatively large gap between long-term
interest rates and the inflation rate during much
of the 1980s may be interpreted as an indicator
of the inflationary expectations of investors. A long
period of relatively low inflation was necessary
to convince investors that the economy would not
repeat the inflationary experience of the 1970s.
While experience of the 1930s illustrates the
adverse effects of deflation on the operation of
our nation’s financial system, the experience of
the 1970s and 1980s illustrates the damage that
can result from a persistent rise in the rate of infla-
tion followed by an abrupt slowing of inflation.
Savings and loans associations (S&Ls) were
especially vulnerable to rising and then falling
inflation in the 1970s and 1980s. For several
decades, these organizations had remained prof-
itable while assuming a great deal of interest rate
risk. The risk arose when S&Ls attracted funds
in the form of short-term deposits provided by
households and lent funds in the form of long-
term, fixed-rate residential mortgages. The S&Ls
were vulnerable to sharp increases in market
interest rates; as rates rose during the 1970s, S&Ls
had to increase deposit rates but were stuck with
the lower rates on long-term mortgages issued in
earlier years. By the time the government got
around to dealing with the problem of the bank-
rupt S&Ls, the cost to the taxpayers was about
$150 billion.
While the problems of the S&Ls created a
mess for the government to resolve, it did not
cause a breakdown in the operation of the pay-
ments system, because the public continued to
have faith in federal deposit insurance. We must
go back to 1933 to find an example of a breakdown
in the operation of our nation’s payment system.
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the S&Ls, lessons from that unhappy experience
were not lost on banking regulators and Congress.
Congress acted to strengthen regulation of deposi-
tory institutions in the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.
SCORE CARD ON CONDITIONS
FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY
Is the Fed achieving its objectives of moder-
ate inflation and financial strength for the
nation’s banking industry? Since 1992, the year-
over-year percentage change in the consumer
price index has been within a range between 1.5
percent and 3.5 percent. Excluding the volatile
food and energy component of the CPI, the range
has been between 2.1 and 3.3 percent. This pat-
tern of inflation rates does not have the kinds of
adverse impacts on the stability of the financial
system that we observed in many earlier years.
In addition, various measures indicate that
the banking industry is in relatively strong finan-
cial condition. I will cite one measure, the ratio
of equity to total assets for all banks. This ratio,
which was 6.4 percent in 1990, was 8.5 percent
in 1998, and has risen further to 9.2 percent in
2002. The strength of the banking system was an
important source of stability in the fall of 1998,
after Russia defaulted on its bonds. That strength
has also been important in limiting the extent of
the recession of 2001 and helping to sustain the
economy in the face of the large decline in the
equity markets.
Finally, during recent years the Federal
Reserve has implemented a policy of ensuring
that default by one or more banks that are involved
in the operation of systems for settlement of finan-
cial transactions would not disrupt the settlement
of transactions by these systems. The Fed acted
vigorously to maintain operation of the payments
system following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and
has since strengthened its processes further.
In an entrepreneurial, market economy busi-
nesses and households are guided by price signals
and expectations of profits from new markets
and new technologies. The Fed’s responsibility
is to maintain a steady general price level and
not to take a position on the appropriateness of
individual prices. We have ample evidence that
stock prices can fluctuate substantially even
while the general level of goods prices is stable.
Avoiding inflationary disturbances to economic
activity and to financial markets is a major
achievement of the last 20 years or so.
As I’ve noted, the U.S. economy in recent
years has experienced financial shocks that had
the potential to become much more serious. I’ve
emphasized that the Fed plays a critical role in
maintaining financial stability through its policies
to promote price stability. The baseline condition
of price stability makes it much more likely that
market responses to shocks will not cumulate to
larger and more general problems.
There is another part of the story, though, that
I have not emphasized so far. That part is the Fed’s
role in responding to any particular shock in what-
ever way is appropriate to deal with the shock. For
example, the collapse of the Twin Towers on 9/11
led to the unavoidable closure of the New York
Stock Exchange and the government securities
markets. The physical clearing process for pay-
ments was damaged, which meant that banks and
firms with bills coming due could not in fact make
the payments, even though they had ample funds.
For example, how do I get home from the airport
if I’m relying on the ATM to get cash to pay the
taxi driver, and find that the ATM is broken? The
funds are in my account, but I can’t get to them.
Because the payments system for large dollar
electronic transfers was broken on 9/11, those
relying on receiving funds to make their own pay-
ments could not obtain the funds they were owed.
The Fed lent massive amounts of funds so these
payments could be made. The Fed’s actions were
tuned to the realities of the particular problem.
So, the Fed’s responsibility is two-fold: First,
to maintain the solid base of price stability and,
second, to respond as needed to offset the effects
of shocks when they occur. The Fed has no way
to prevent all shocks, but it can limit the collateral
damage that would otherwise flow from them.
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Reserve is generally effective in minimizing
collateral damage from unpredictable shocks.
Minimizing, though, is not the same thing as
eliminating. An important item of unfinished
business is to examine changes in government
policy and market practice that might reduce the
likelihood and severity of shocks in the first place.
But that is the subject of another lecture another
day. Indeed, the subject is so large that it deserves
several lectures on several days.
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